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I. INTRODUCTION-HEARSAY AND EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY
A. The Thirty-Fourth Hearsay Exception
The Oklahoma Evidence Code' creates thirty-four exceptions to
the rule against hearsay. Twenty-nine are express hearsay exceptions
which are set out in sections 2803 and 2804.2 Four are "exceptions by
1. Oklahoma Evidence Code, ch. 285, 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws 801 (codified as OKLA. STAT.
tit. 12, §§ 2101 to 2107, 2201 to 2203, 2301 to 2305, 2401 to 2411, 2501 to 2513, 2601 to 2615, 2701
to 2705, 2801 to 2806, 2901 to 2903, 3001 to 3008, and 3101 to 3103). In this article all citations as
well as textual references to the Oklahoma Evidence Code will be designated by the codified
section numbers.
2. The next article in this series will discuss the express hearsay exceptions in §§ 2803 and
2804.
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definition" created by provisions in section 2801. Section 2801 pur-
ports merely to define "hearsay," but follows Federal Evidence Rule
801 and adopts such an elaborate definition of "hearsay" that several
categories of statements which would otherwise be considered hearsay,
are declared not to be hearsay.3 There are arguments which can be
made to justify special treatment of each of these categories of state-
ments, and the draftsmen of both section 28014 and Federal Evidence
Rule 801 found those arguments persuasive. Many lawyers, however,
are likely to find it confusing and unsatisfactory to describe these cate-
gories of statements as nonhearsay because the statements included in
each category are to be admitted into evidence for the purpose of prov-
ing the truth of what they either state or imply. It may be more helpful
to recognize that these categories of statements are hearsay under pre-
Code standards, and that the purpose of the provisions of section 2801
is to create hearsay "exceptions by definition" by which statements in
these categories are admitted for the purpose of proving the truth of
either what they state or imply.
Three "exceptions by definition" appear in section 2801(4). These
are, (1) an exception for sworn prior inconsistent statements by a wit-
ness,6 (2) an exception for prior consistent statements by a witness,7 and
(3) an exception for admissions by a party-opponent.8 Section 2801(1)
creates a fourth "exception by definition" for non-assertive conduct9
offered as circumstantial evidence of the actor's beliefs.'"
Many of these first thirty-three hearsay exceptions might be used
3. See Blakey, An Introduction to the Oklahoma Evidence Code: Hearsay, 14 TULSA L. J.
635, 638-42 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Introduction II].
4. See the arguments made by the Subcommittee on Evidence of the Code Procedure-
Civil Committee of the Oklahoma Bar Association in their note to their proposed Rule 801 in
Proposed Oklahoma Code of Evidence, 47 OKLA. B. J. 2605, 2644-45 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Proposed Code]. The notes prepared by the Oklahoma Evidence Subcommittee were revised after
the adoption of the Oklahoma Evidence Code by the legislature and these revised notes appear
throughout OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2101-3103 (West Supp. 1980) in the form of comments
upon the enacted sections.
5. The arguments by the Federal Advisory Committee which drafted the first versions of
Federal Evidence Rule 801 appear in Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 293-97 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Federal Rules].
6. See Introduction 11, supra note 3, at 655-77.
7. See id at 677-80.
8. See id. at 644-54.
9. See id. at 681-94.
10. The Oklahoma Evidence Code did not adopt one "exception by definition" that appears
in Federal Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(C). That provision creates a hearsay exception for prior state-
ments by a witness if they are statements "of identification of a person made after perceiving
him." See Introduction 11, supra note 3, at 680-81; Note, Admissibili&y f Extrajudicial ndentmfca-
tilons, 32 OKLA. L. Rev. 462 (1979).
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to admit evidence necessary to introduce or support expert opinion tes-
timony. These include hearsay exceptions created by the Code for
statements of sensation or physical condition," statements made for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, 2 medical records,' 3 and
learned treatises.'4 The Code also creates a special thirty-fourth hear-
say exception which applies only to the testimony of expert witnesses.
This new hearsay exception in section 2703 is a part of a new set of
theories about testimony by expert witnesses.
B. Testimony by Expert Witnesses Under the Oklahoma Evidence
Code
Sections 2701 through 2705 of the Oklahoma Evidence Code are
virtually identical to Federal Rules of Evidence 701 through 705. '
These sections adopt the philosophy of those Federal Rules that opin-
ion and expert witness testimony ought to be admissible whenever they
would be helpful to the trier of fact.' 6 In order to achieve that goal,
these sections restate the requirements for the admission of opinion and
expert witness testimony in ways intended to assure that helpful opin-
ion and expert witness testimony is not excluded. Most of the changes
in past law adopted by these sections merely eliminate prior barriers to
opinion and expert witness testimony that might be termed "artificial".
Thus, section 2702 provides that expert opinion testimony is admissible
whenever such testimony will assist the trier of fact. This section rejects
the argument that an idea must be beyond the comprehension of a lay
factfinder before expert testimony may be used. ' 7 Section 2702 also
states clearly that some quite ordinary person may be an expert witness
if his experience gives him the requisite knowledge concerning a point
11. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2803(3).
12. Id. § 2803(4).
13. Id. § 2803(6).
14. Id. § 2803(18).
15. There is one insignificant change in the language of § 2705.
16. "The basic approach to opinions, lay and expert, in these rules is to admit them when
helpful to the trier of fact." Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 5, at 284 (quoted in Proposed
Code, supra note 4, at 2642).
17. See C. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13 (2d ed, E. Cleary
1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]; 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 382 (1979) [hereinafter cited as LoUISELL & MUELLER].
Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger appear to read into the "helpfulness test" the old stan-
dard that the subject of expert testimony must lie "beyond common knowledge," 3 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702 [01] at 702-6 (1978 & Supp. 1979) [hereinafter cited
as WEINSTEIN & BEROER] but go on to advocate the admission of helpful expert testimony even if
it does not meet a "beyond common knowledge" test. Id. at 702-8 & 702-10.
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in a trial.'" Section 2704 rejects the idea that an enlightening opinion
should be excluded because the issue with which it deals is "an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of facts."' 9 Two sections of the Code,
however, contain far more drastic alterations of prior law. Sections
2703 and 2705 completely change the theory of expert witness testi-
mony.2
0
Prior to the adoption of the Code an expert witness was usually
held to be different from any other witness in only one respect: he was
qualified to form and express an opinion which a lay witness would not
be permitted to express. In all other respects he was considered to be
an ordinary witness. He could testify to the existence of facts only if he
had the same sort of personal knowledge of those facts that was re-
quired of a lay witness. If he lacked the requisite personal knowledge
of all the facts necessary to form an opinion, he would be forced to give
an answer to a hypothetical question which assumed the existence of
the necessary facts. 21 He would not be permitted to answer such a hy-
pothetical question unless the record contained evidence which would
support a finding by the trier of fact that each hypothetical fact actually
existed.22
Sections 2703 and 2705 largely overturn all of these requirements.
Section 2705 gives the trial judge discretion to permit an expert witness
to state an opinion without the use of a hypothetical question, even
though the expert witness lacks personal knowledge of the facts upon
which that opinion is based. Under section 2703 an expert witness
may, if certain requirements are met, render an opinion based upon
facts that are not in evidence and which may not even be admissible.
One purpose of these changes is to allow expert witnesses to reach
their opinions and to explain those opinions in almost the same manner
that they would in their offices and laboratories. The Oklahoma Evi-
dence Subcommittee stated, quoting the Federal Advisory Committee:
"In this respect the rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert
opinions beyond that currently recognized in many jurisdictions and to
bring the judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts
18. See Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 5, at 282.
19. See 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1920 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1978).
20. See generally, Blakey, An Introduction to the Oklahoma Evidence Code: Relevancy, Com-
petency, Privileges, Wtnesses Opinion, and Expert Witnesses, 14 TULSA L.J. 227, 315-20 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Introduction I] and McElhaney, Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 28 MERCER L. REV. 463 (1977) [hereinafter cited as McElhaneyl.
21. Proposed Code, supra note 4, at 2643; MCCORMICK supra note 17, §§ 14 & 15.
22. MCCORMICK, supra note 17, § 14 at 33.
1980]
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themselves when not in court. 23
The new rules adopted by sections 2703 and 2705 make a drastic
change in the theory of expert testimony but they do not make nearly
as drastic a change in actual courtroom practice. The frequent conflicts
between the ways in which expert witnesses actually reached their
opinions and the ways in which pre-Code law attempted to control ex-
pert testimony were often resolved by compromises violating formal
legal rules.24 Undoubtedly, in pre-Code Oklahoma as elsewhere, ex-
pert witnesses were permitted to assume the existence of facts known to
them through sources that were not properly introduced into evidence,
although in such cases the parties risked the sort of reversal found in
Fuller v. Lemmons.25 Furthermore, expert witnesses in many cases ig-
nored what the lawyers and judges told them about legal rules and hy-
pothetical questions and they gave their actual opinions based upon
whatever they believed the facts to be. Sections 2703 and 2705 do not
go so far as to authorize any form of testimony that an expert witness
might choose to give, but they do eliminate (or give the trial judge the
discretion to eliminate) almost all restrictions to which an expert wit-
ness might reasonably object.
C. Oklahoma Evidence Code Section 2705 Gives the Trial Judge
Discretion to Permit an Expert Witness to State an
Opinion Without Disclosure of the Facts upon
*hich His Opinion Is Based
Under pre-Code law, if an expert witness lacked personal knowl-
edge of the essential facts necessary to form an opinion, he had to be
asked a hypothetical question2 6 which assumed the necessary facts to
support his opinion.27 The hypothetical question was necessary be-
23. Proposed Code, supra note 4, at 2642 (quoting Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 5, at
283.)
24. See WEINsTEIN & BERGER, supra notes 17, 1 703 [01] at 703-8 through 703-15. See also
Maguire & Hahesy, Requisite Pro of /Basis for Expert Opinion, 5 VAND. L. REV. 432 (1952) and
Rheingold, The Basis ofaMedical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1962).
25. 434 P.2d 145 (Okla. 1967). This decision is discussed in the text accompanying notes 81-
89 infra.
26. Proposed Code, supra note 4, at 2643. In some cases it was possible to avoid the worst
features of the full hypothetical question by inviting the expert witness to listen to the introduction
of the evidence which was offered to prove the facts upon which his opinion was to be based, and
then by instructing him to assume the truth of the testimony he had heard. That was only another
form of hypothetical question. Colley v. Sapp, 44 Okla. 16, 142 P. 989 (1914); 2 J. WIOMORE,
EVIDENCE § 681 (3d ed. 1940).
27. McCoRMicK, supra note 17, § 14 at 33.
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cause a statement by the expert which stated or assumed the truth of
any facts outside his personal knowledge would be hearsay.
The draftsmen of section 2705 and Federal Evidence Rule 705 de-
cided to reduce the number of situations requiring the use of hypotheti-
cal questions. 28 They did so by adopting a change in existing law
which was far more radical than the creation of a new hearsay excep-
tion, although it incidentally creates a minor hearsay exception not in-
cluded in the thirty-four previously mentioned. Section 2705 provides
that "the expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give
his reasons therefore without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or
data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may be required
to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination."
This is a radical change from pre-Code law, under which the basis
of an expert opinion was considered an essential foundation necessary
to prove the correctness of that opinion.29 Under section 2705, unless
the court requires that the basis be shown, an expert opinion can stand
on its own, without any apparent basis.30 There must still be a basis in
fact, but that basis may not appear in the evidence introduced into the
record. The Subcommittee on Proposed Rules of Evidence of the Col-
orado Bar Association objected to this change during the congressional
debates on the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence and offered
the following illustration:
The proposed rules require no foundation to be admitted on
which the expert based his opinion. Your committee feels
that it is absolutely essential that a foundation be required
before an expert opinion be admitted. Otherwise, once any
expert has been qualified as such he could offer his opinion on
any matter with no reasons to support that opinion. For ex-
ample, one can envision the following dialogue immediately
after the expert had been qualified as an orthopedic surgeon:
Q. Doctor, do you have an opinion based upon a reason-
able degree of medical certainty as to the extent ofperma-
nent disability suffered by the plaintiff as a result [oft this
automobile accident?
A. Yes.
Q. What isyour opinion?
A. She is totally and permanently disabled.
28. Proposed Code, supra note 4, at 2643; Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 5, at 285.
29. J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 672 (3d ed. 1940).
30. See note 33 infra.
1980]
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Q. Thank you, doctor, that is all3
In fact, it is unlikely that very many plaintiffs' attorneys would be will-
ing to stop at that point. Weinstein and Berger, however, quote the
statement by the Colorado subcommittee3 2 and then comment, "Con-
gress found no objection to such brevity. Many judges would welcome
it." 33
Section 2705 speaks only of permitting a party not to make a
"prior disclosure" of the basis of an expert opinion, but it clearly means
that a party may be permitted to introduce opinion testimony the basis
for which has not been disclosed and may never be disclosed. The op-
posing party may always bring out, on cross-examination, any portion
of the basis that it finds profitable to disclose. It is possible, in this
situation, that the facts brought out on cross-examination by the oppos-
ing party may reveal that there is no adequate basis for the opinion. If
that should happen, the opposing party should move to strike the ex-
pert's opinion.
At common law, the opposing party would also have had a right to
have the expert's opinion stricken if the facts brought out on cross-
examination revealed that the expert did not have personal knowledge
of the facts upon which his opinion was based, even if there was evi-
deiice in the record to support a finding that those facts did exist.
Under the Code, that is no longer true. Section 2705 serves as a minor
hearsay exception in cases in which the expert's opinion is based upon
facts that have been introduced into evidence, but which are not within
his personal knowledge. Under pre-Code law, the use of a hypothetical
question was required in such a situation to avoid a hearsay objection
that the facts were not within the expert's personal knowledge. By per-
mitting an expert witness to give an opinion in such a situation without
the use of a hypothetical question section 2705 creates a minor hearsay
exception to solve that problem. This exception also permits the expert
31. Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomt o,+ Criminal Justice for-
merly designated as Special Subcommn on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws) [sic] the House Comm
on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess., Ser. 2, Supp. at 353, 355-56 (1973).
32. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, 1 705[01] at 705-1 & 705-2.
33. Id. 705[01] at 705-2. Louisell and Mueller comment on this same illustration: "It is
precisely this kind of testimony which Rule 705 envisions and modem decisions recognize as
such." LoUlSELL & MUELLER, supra note 17 § 400, at 707 (footnote omitted). McElhaney sug-
gests that the illustrated testimony may be longer than the Federal Rules of Evidence require and
offers a shorter version:
Q. Doctor, would you tell us about the plaintiff's condition, please?
A. Yes. She is totally permanently disabled.
Q. Thank you, doctor, that is all.
McElhaney, supra note 20, at 480.
[Vol. 16:1
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to refer to facts that are in evidence but not within his personal knowl-
edge in order to explain his opinion.
The section 2705 exception only applies to facts which are already
in evidence and which, therefore, could have been included in a hypo-
thetical question if one had been used. The expert may base his opin-
ion upon facts that are not in evidence only if those facts satisfy the
requirements of the second sentence of section 2703.
How does an expert learn what particular facts are in evidence and
which, therefore, may be used as a basis for his opinion? The Code
does not deal with this question and it appears that no particular
method is required. The expert can clearly base his opinion upon other
testimony which he has actually heard, but it would also appear proper
for him to rely upon a transcript which he read, or even an oral sum-
mary of other testimony.
Section 2705 does not abolish the hypothetical question.34 Parties
may use hypothetical questions or other traditional methods of explain-
ing or supporting expert testimony whenever the need arises, in order
to make expert testimony both understandable and persuasive.3 5
Nevertheless, there will be cases in which a party will decide to
offer at least some expert opinion testimony without disclosing the basis
for it. Whenever this happens, both the trial judge and the opposing
party will be confronted with a series of potentially difficult decisions.
It is always within the power of the trial judge to require disclosure of
the basis of an expert opinion prior to that opinion's admission, but it is
34. "[T]he federal draftsmen have made it clear that the use of the hypothetical question
usually is optional." G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 397-98 (1978) [here-
inafter cited as LILLY]. Dean Read agrees: "[Hjypothetical questions can still be used at the
option of the questioner." F. READ, OKLAHOMA EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 2705, at 192 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as OKLAHOMA EVIDENCE HANDBOOK].
The new rules do raise new problems with respect to the use of hypothetical questions.
"Questions arise as to what standards hypothetical questions must now meet. May a party who
did not need to use a hypothetical question at all use an incomplete one? It would appear that the
trial judge still has power to exclude questions that are unfair and misleading." BLAKELY, Opinion
and Expert Testimony in THE OKLAHOMA EVIDENCE CODE 121 (OBA/CLE Institute, July 7,
1978). Professor McElhaney suggests that parties may now ask better, more flexible hypotheticals.
"The real advantage of Rule 705 is that it permits a streamlining of hypothetical questions. They
no longer need to be stiff and stylized. As long as they are not misleading, there is no reason why
an examiner cannot be far more selective than before in choosing the contents of hypothetical
questions." McElhaney, supra note 20, at 488 (quoted in McCoRMICK, supra note 17, § 16 (Supp.
1978)).
35. P. ROTHSTEIN, RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGIS-
TRATES 291 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES]; WEINSTEIN & BER-
GER, supra note 17, 705 [01] at 705-6 & 705-7; Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414,
428 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Ladd]. See also LOUiSELL & MUELLER, supra note 17, § 400
(Supp. 1980).
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clear that the draftsmen of section 2705 did not intend for the trial
judge to impose such a requirement in all cases,36 or even in those cases
in which the opposing party objects to the introduction of an unex-
plained expert opinion.37 It is likely, therefore, that the opposing party
will now find it necessary to persuade the trial judge that prior disclo-
sure of the basis of this particular opinion should be required. I stated
in an earlier article in this series:
It seems clear that the burden of persuading the court
that there is an adequate basis for an expert opinion remains
with the party who offers the opinion as evidence. The bur-
den of raising a bona fide question about the adequacy of that
basis, however, has apparently been shifted to the party seek-
ing to oppose the introduction of that opinion. However, this
might be more accurately described as a "burden of discov-
ery" than as a burden of coming forward. In a case in which
the opposing party can justify its failure to conduct adequate
discovery, the trial court probably should exercise its discre-
tion to require that the basis for an expert opinion be shown
by the party offering the opinion.38
The opposing party will be confronted by a similar problem if ex-
pert opinions are admitted without prior disclosure of their bases. The
olposing party has a right to expose the weaknesses of such opinions
through cross-examination, but it will probably be impossible to con-
duct that cross-examination effectively, 39 without full discovery of the
36. McElhaney argues:
The other way to deal with the problem is to ask the trial court to require hypothetical
questions, retreating from the advances of the Federal Rules. This backward step is not
likely to be attractive to federal district judges, whose crowded dockets can be eased by
the timesaving aspects of Article 7. Since both the voir dire examination and the hypo-
thetical question are now discretionary with the trial court, it seems probable that they
will only be imposed by the court when the opposing counsel asserts on the ood-faith
basis of full discovery that the opinion about to be offered will ultimately be inadmissi-
ble.
McElhaney, supra note 20, at 489. Louisell and Mueller agree:
The phrasing of the Rule suggests that this kind of to-the-point presentation should
be routinely allowed. To be sure, the Rule allows the trial judge to "require otherwise";
however, the sense of the provision is that he should not so require as a practice, but
should do so only where he finds particular facts, peculiarly important in the individual
case, which indicate a special need to develop the foundation first.
LoUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 17 § 400, at 707.
37. "Section [2705] gives the trial court, not the opposing party, the discretion to require that
the basis be shown." Introduction I, supra note 20, at 317.
38. Id. at 318.
39. The Federal Advisory Committee stated in defense of Federal Evidence Rule 703:
If the objection is made that leaving it to the cross-examiner to bring out the sup-
porting data is essentially unfair, the answer is that he is under no compulsion to bring
out any facts or data except those unfavorable to the opinion. The answer assumes that
[Vol. 16:1
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basis of the expert's opinion.4°
D. Oklahoma Evidence Code Section 2703 Creates an Exception to
the Hearsay Rule
Section 2703 permits an expert witness to give his actual opinion in
many cases in which his opinion is based upon facts beyond his per-
sonal knowledge. The language of section 2703, which is identical to
Federal Evidence Rule 703, does not say this directly, but it does
clearly lead to this conclusion. Section 2703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived
by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible in evidence.
The effect of this language is to permit an expert to base his opin-
ion upon a fact in any of three situations: (1) those situations in which
he has personal knowledge of the fact; (2) those situations in which the
fact is "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field," and the fact has been "made known" to him; or, (3) those situa-
tions in which the fact was "made known" to him and also introduced
into evidence at the trial or hearing. The language of the Oklahoma
Evidence Subcommittee4' and the Federal Advisory Committee42
the cross-examiner has the advance knowledge which is essential for effective cross-ex-
amination. This advance knowledge has been afforded, though imperfectly, by the tradi-
tional foundation requirement. Rule 26(b)(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as revised,
provides for substantial discovery in this area, obviating in large measure the obstacles
which have been raised in some instances to discovery of findings, underlying data, and
even the identity of the experts.
Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 5, at 286.
40. See the text accompanying notes 106-125 infra for a discussion the discovery problems
related to § 2705.
41. The Oklahoma Evidence Subcommittee's note to its rule which became § 2703 stated:
Facts or data upon which the expert opinions are based may, under the rule be
derived from three possible sources. First, data may be derived from the firsthand obser-
vations of the witness, with his opinions based on those observations being traditionally
allowed by the courts. The observations of a treating physician affords an example of
this type of data. Whether the expert would first have to relate his observations is treated
in Rule 705. Second, the facts or data may be derived from evidence presented at trial.
The technique may be the familiar hypothetical question or having the expert attend the
trial and hear the testimony establishing the facts. Problems of determining what testi-
mony the expert relied upon, when the latter technique is employed and the testimony is
conflict, may be resolved by resort to Rule 705. The third source contemplated by the
rule consists of presentation of data to the expert outside of court and other than by his
own perception. In this respect the rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert opin-
ions beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial practice into line
with the practice of the experts themselves when not in court. Thus a physician in his
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states somewhat more clearly than section 2703 does, that facts which
do not qualify under the second sentence of section 2703 must be intro-
duced into evidence, but some such restriction can be logically inferred
from the existence of the second sentence.43
The language of the first sentence of section 2703 also appears
broad enough to abolish the requirement that a hypothetical question
must be used whenever an expert witness is testifying to an opinion that
is based upon facts outside his personal knowledge. Again, the lan-
guage of the notes suggests that a less radical change was intended.
Both the notes to section 2705" and Federal Rule of Evidence 70545
suggest that it was necessary for those rules to abolish the requirement
of prior disclosure of the foundation of an expert opinion in order to
abolish the requirement of a hypothetical question. Furthermore,
under section 2705 the trial judge has discretion to require "prior dis-
closure of the underlying facts or data," and this apparently means that
the judge has discretion to require the use of a hypothetical question.
The argument could be made that neither rule or note actually states
that the trial judge may require the use of a hypothetical question as
the means by which "prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data" is
own practice bases his diagnosis on information from numerous sources and of consider-
able variety, including statements by patients and relatives, reports and opinions from
nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records, and X-rays. Most of them are
admissible in evidence, but ony with the expenditure of substantial time in producing
and examining various authenticating witnesses. The physician makes life-and-death
decisions in reliance upon them. His validation, expertly performed and subject to cross-
examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes.
Proposed Code, supra note 4, at 2642 (paraphrasing the explanation of Federal Rule 703 by the
Federal Advisory Committee).
42. Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 5, at 283.
43. The commentators generally appear to read Federal Evidence Rule 703 as requiring that
facts not within an expert witness' personal knowledge be "made known" to him through conven-
tional methods unless those facts qualify under the second sentence of the rule. Thus, McElhaney
describes the first sentence of the rule as making "no giant leaps." McElhaney, supra note 20, at
481. Weinstein and Berger state, "[s]ince the first sentence of Rule 703 is a restatement of previous
law, the courts will continue as before to permit experts to testify from personal experience or
from facts obtained at trial." WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, 1 703 [03]. Seealso LOUISELL
& MUELLER, supra note 17 § 388, at 654, and S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 425 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as SALTZBURG & REDDEN]. However,
Professor Rothstein argues that Rule 703 changes prior law to authorize an expert witness to base
his testimony upon a "beforehand briefing" which it appears that Professor Rothstein believes
may not be subject to the reasonably relied upon test of the second sentence of Rule 703. RoTH-
STEIN, FEDERAL RULES, supra note 35, at 275-76. But see Id. at 293; P. ROTHSTEIN, UNDER-
STANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 81 (1973 & Supps. 1974, 1975) [hereinafter
cited as ROTHSTEiN, UNDERSTANDING]. The first sentence of the rule, if taken by itself, would
support such an interpretation, but the second sentence and the Advisory Committee comments
would appear to exclude it.
44. Proposed Code, supra note 4, at 2643.
45. Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 5, at 283.
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to be made. A fair reading of the notes would indicate that the drafts-
men of section 2705 and Federal Evidence Rule 705 expected that prior
law, requiring the use of hypothetical questions to lay the foundation
for opinion testimony by expert witnesses lacking personal knowledge
of necessary facts, would continue except insofar as it was modified by
section 2705 and Federal Rule 705. Certainly, two of the draftsmen of
those rules assumed, in their writings, that the trial judge has the dis-
cretion to require the use of hypothetical questions. Judge Weinstein
served on the Federal Advisory Committee. Weinstein and Berger
note that "[t]he requirement of the hypothetical question is abolished,
and use of this technique is made optional, subject to the discretion of
the court."'  Similarly, Dean Read, who served as Chairman of the
"S.C.R. 69 Committee' which reviewed the draft of the Oklahoma Evi-
dence Code prepared by the Oklahoma Evidence Subcommittee and
recommended its adoption, wrote: "Note that the elimination of the
hypothetical question is not absolute. The use of an opinion, without
disclosure of underlying facts, is subject to the qualifying words 'unless
the court requires otherwise.'" 47
Nevertheless, it might be inappropriate to require the use of a hy-
pothetical question when an expert witness is basing his opinion upon
facts which are not within his personal knowledge, but which qualify
under the second sentence of section 2703 as facts or data "of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject." In that situation, section 2703
permits the expert witness to serve as the means by which information
about these facts may be introduced into evidence. The next section of
this article will examine the question whether the expert witness should
be permitted to testify about facts not within his personal knowledge.
In any event, section 2703 serves as a hearsay exception for those facts
by permitting the expert's opinion to be based upon them.48
46. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, 705 [01] at 705-6.
47. OKLAHOMA EVIDENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 34 § 2705, at 192.
48. See Frazier v. Continental Oil Co., 568 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1978).
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II. MAY AN EXPERT WITNESS TESTIFY TO OTHERWISE
INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY UPON WHICH HIS
OPINION Is BASED?
A. Oklahoma Evidence Code Section 2703 Creates a Hearsay
Exceptionfor Facts upon Which an Expert Witness Has
Based an Admissible Opinion
To what extent does reliance by an expert witness on facts not in
evidence to form the basis of his opinion permit that information to be
introduced into evidence through his testimony? Section 2703 states
only that the expert's opinion may be based upon such facts. The Code
does not explain how such an opinion is to be introduced, or cross-
examined. It seems clear, however, that an expert witness must be per-
mitted to explain the basis of his opinion whenever that opinion is ad-
missible. No other result would be logical. A reasonable examination
of an expert witness whose opinion is based on information which
is not in evidence would be impossible without disclosing and examin-
ing that out of court information. Consider the problem of cross-
examination by the opposing party. How can the opposing party per-
suade the jury not to accept an opinion, if the rules of evidence require
the expert witness to say, "I have an adequate reason for my opinion,
but I am not permitted to state it in court."
The party conducting the direct examination of such an expert wit-
ness has the same problem. How can this party persuade the jury to
believe that an expert's opinion is correct, if the expert is not permitted
to explain the basis forming the opinion?49 Under section 2705, the
party offering the expert's opinion testimony may be required to lay a
foundation before the opinion may be offered as evidence.50 If that
party is required to lay a foundation for the opinion, the particular out
of court information upon which the expert is relying comprises part of
the foundation that must be shown. Conversely, if no foundation is
required and the party merely introduces evidence to increase the ex-
pert's credibility, the expert continues to have the right to base his opin-
ion on the out of court information, and the party should continue to
have the right to explain that out of court information.
If we accept, as a fact, that section 2703 means what it says, that
expert witnesses may base their opinions on certain kinds of informa-
tion that are not in evidence, we must deal with this information just as
49. See Ladd, supra note 35, at 428.
50. See discussion in text accompanying notes 26-33 supra.
[Vol. 16:1
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 16 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss1/1
HEMRSA Y
we deal with any other information upon which experts base their
opinions. Subject to certain limits, a party examining an expert witness
whose opinion is based upon information which is not in evidence, but
which is "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field" may bring out the information which is not in evidence either on
direct examination or on cross-examination of the expert witness.5 1 It
would appear proper to include the information in hypothetical ques-
tions addressed to the expert witness himself. After the expert witness
has testified that he is relying upon this information, the information
may be used in hypothetical questions addressed to other expert wit-
nesses.
For purposes of this analysis it does not matter whether the facts
not in evidence upon which the expert has based his opinion would be
admissible if offered as evidence or if they are inadmissible, except
under section 2703. The most important practical result of section 2703
is that it frees the parties from the burden of proving those facts reason-
ably relied upon by experts which could be admitted in evidence "but
only with the expenditure of substantial time in producing and examin-
ing various authenticating witnesses. ' 2 The most exciting aspect of
this analysis, however, is the prospect that otherwise totally inadmissi-
ble evidence may be admissible under section 2703 and Federal Evi-
dence Rule 703. Therefore, many of the discussions of section 2703
and Rule 703 refer to the hearsay exception created by those rules as a
hearsay exception for otherwise inadmissible hearsay. 3 None of these
discussions appear to contend that the exception is, in fact, limited to
otherwise inadmissible evidence; they are simply focusing on the most
interesting possible use of the exception. A more descriptive title would
be either bland or awkward. The discussions are essentially consistent
with the broader ideas in this article.5 4
51. These limits are discussed in part IV of this article.
52. Proposed Code, supra note 4, at 2642 (quoting from Proposed Federal Rules, supra note
5, at 283).
53. SALTZBuRG & REDDEN, supra note 43, at 426-27; ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING, supra
note 43, at 82-83. But see ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES supra note 35, at 277; Note, Admissibiliy
of an Expert Opinion Based on Inadmissible Hearsay, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 444, 451 (1979).
54. A student note in the Oklahoma Law Review recognizes the need to admit otherwise
inadmissible hearsay whenever expert witnesses are permitted to base their opinions upon such
evidence. The note asks: "[w]hat, then, is the evidentiary status of inadmissible data which the
expert has reasonably relied upon, and which the jury will hear when the court requires disclosure
of those facts or when they are brought out on cross-examination?" The note falls into error,.
however, because it attempts to avoid the logic of that very question with an argument that the
inadmissible data admitted in this situation are not hearsay. They are hearsay, they are being
admitted for a hearsay purpose, and § 2703 serves as an exception to the rule against hearsay
1980]
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The changes adopted by section 2703 will appear far less alarming
if the changes are recognized as a new hearsay exception which is based
upon a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness. The fact that experts
reasonably rely upon out of court information which qualifies for use
under section 2703 provides a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthi-
ness that compares favorably with the guarantees underlying such es-
tablished hearsay exceptions as business records 5 and declarations
against self interest.16 None of these circumstances provides an abso-
lute guarantee that an out of court statement is accurate, but they each
provide a strong enough indication that a statement is accurate to jus-
tify an exception to the hearsay rule.
B. Interpretations of Federal Evidence Rule 703 Largely Find That
the Rule Creates a Hearsay Exceptionfor Facts upon
Which an Expert Witness Has Based an Admissible
Opinion
Federal Evidence Rule 703 is identical to Oklahoma Evidence
Code section 2703, and the same problem will arise under it whenever
an expert witness is permitted to state an opinion based upon informa-
tion which is not in evidence. Only a few courts and a few writers have
to date undertaken to discuss how that question should be decided
under Rule 703. The conclusions of those who have done so largely
support the position that, whenever an expert opinion which is based
upon facts that are not in evidence is properly admissible under Rule
703, then those facts should also be admissible either on direct exami-
nation or cross-examination of the expert. Professors Saltzburg and
Redden have articulated the strongest statement of this position:
Rule 703 plainly provides for reliance by experts on facts
or data that are not admissible in evidence to arrive at an
opinion or inference. But the Rule does not indicate whether
the expert can state for the jury the factual basis of an opinion
if the facts are of a type generally excluded from evidence.
Rule 705 is not helpful on this point either. The best reading
of Rule 703 in our view is to read the word "otherwise" into
the last sentence of the Rule before the word "admissible."
The result of this reading is that the expert can not only rely
when they are admitted. Note, Admissibility of an Expert Opinion Based on Inadmissible Hearsay,
32 OKLA. L. REv. 444, 451 (1979).
55. § 2803(6).
56. § 2804(B)(3).
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on facts reasonably relied upon by experts in his field, but also
can give a full account to the jury, which is necessary to insure
that the jury has a basis for properly assessing the testimony.57
Professor Rothstein suggests that the last sentence of Federal Evidence
Rule 705 does give the cross-examiner the right to bring out facts not in
evidence upon which the expert has based his opinion, but he is more
cautious about the rights of the direct examiner.
The question whether underlying materials and informa-
tion (books, lectures, medical reports, patient statements, con-
sultations, polls, etc.) can themselves be brought out on direct
examination when they are otherwise of an inadmissible vari-
ety, is left somewhat in limbo, because Rule 703 speaks only
to the admissibility of the opinion based thereon. Rule 705
(disclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinions) is sim-
ilarly inconclusive on this question:
Rule 705 abrogates any requirement that underlying facts
and data must be brought out on direct examination (unless
the judge requires); but says nothing about whether the direct
examiner can do so if he wishes to voluntarily where the facts
and data would themselves be inadmissible. Rule 705 and the
comments to 705, to 803(4) (final paragraph), and to 1002 (pe-
nultimate paragraph) seem to imply that he can. 8
The strongest judicial statement on the disclosure of facts not in
evidence if used as the basis of an expert opinion appears in a decision
in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ulti-
mately held that the statements in issue should not have been admitted
because they were not trustworthy and were not relied upon by the
expert. In Bryan v. John Bean Division 9 the Fifth Circuit stated:
The modem view in evidence law recognizes that experts
often rely on facts and data supplied by third parties. See
Fed. R. Evid. 703. Rules 703 and 705 codify the approach of
this and other circuits that permits the disclosure of otherwise
hearsay evidence for the purpose of illustrating the basis of
the expert witness' opinion. . . . Since rule 705 shifts to the
crossexaminer the burden of eliciting the bases of an expert
witness' opinion, otherwise hearsay evidence that reveals the
underlying sources of the expert's opinion should be as per-
missible on cross-examination as on direct. Moreover, other-
57. SALTZBURo & REDDEN, supra note 43, at 426-27.58. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING, sulpra note 43, at 82-83. But see ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL
RULES, supra note 35, at 277.
59. 566 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978).
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wise hearsay evidence disclosing the basis of an expert
witness' opinion should be admissible to impeach if strictly
limited to that purpose by instructions and if, in the discretion
of the judge, the impeaching evidence has sufficient guarantee
of reliability that the prophylactic effect of the hearsay rule is
not necessary to ensure trustworthiness. 60
It would, therefore, appear that Professor McElhaney is correct
when he describes Federal Evidence Rule 703 as "virtually a major
new exception to the hearsay rule. ' 6' Apparently, the only authority
flatly denying the admissibility of hearsay statements relied upon by an
expert witness as a basis for an admissible opinion is a statement by
Professor Kimball in his Programmed Materials on Problems in Evi-
dence in which Professor Kimball asserts:
FRE 703 justifies the expert's forming his opinion on the
basis of hearsay, if experts in his field customarily rely on that
sort of information, but this does not justify his retailing that
information to the jury for the jury's evaluation. It is to be his
opinion that the jury receives not the opinions or observations
of others which the witness merely relays to the jury as a com-
posite judgment.62
The position of Professors Louisell and Mueller is unclear. They
write that Rule 703 "was not designed to enable a witness to summarize
and reiterate all manner of inadmissible evidence." 63 They also state
that "[wihile an expert may, pursuant to Rule 703, testify on a basis of
facts or data which are themselves inadmissible in evidence, his stand-
ing as an expert does not open the door for testimony which simply
recites such facts or data if they are indeed inadmissible."'64 It is not
clear, however, whether Louisell and Mueller's statements are meant to
advocate a reading of Rule 703 under which an expert's opinion could
be based upon facts which could not be discussed in evaluating his
opinion. Louisell and Mueller certainly do not suggest how such a sys-
tem would work.6 5 Their statements may merely be meant to point out
that Rule 703 does not authorize the admission of inadmissible infor-
60. Id. at 545.
61. McElhaney, supra note 20, at 481.
62. E. KIMBALL, PROGRAMMED MATERIALS ON PROBLEMS IN EVIDENcE 268 (1978).
63. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 17 § 389, at 663.
64. Id. at 647.
65. Louisell and Mueller do point out, however, that the whole idea of expert testimony
based upon facts not in evidence may be subject to attack in criminal cases on confrontation
grounds. Id. at 663-65. They also suggest that it is likely to be a problem if the expert witness is
viewed as a "summary witness" who merely reports out of court hearsay. Id. at 665 & n.80. Their
analysis does not consider, however, the argument that hearsay admitted under the second sen-
[Vol. 16:1
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mation known to the expert, if that information does not form the basis
of a properly admissible opinion. In United States v. Brown,66 the prin-
cipal case Louisell and Mueller rely on, the majority rejected67 an argu-
ment by the dissent68 that Federal Rule 703 was one way to justify the
admission of testimony by an Internal Revenue Agent that ninety to
ninety-five percent of a sample of income tax returns prepared by the
defendant contained overstated deductions.69 The majority did not,
however, draw any distinction between an admissible expert opinion
and an inadmissible basis. They rejected the agent's entire testimony as
"hearsay of the rankest kind,"70 and held that admission of it was
"plain error" justifying reversal even though no objection to it had
been made at trial.71
The conflict between the majority and the dissent in Brown illus-
trates a problem that will arise if the hearsay exception created by sec-
tion 2703 and Rule 703 is held to apply only to expert opinions and not
to the facts upon which those opinions are based. Frequently, difficulty
arises in characterizing a particular statement by an expert as either an
opinion, or a fact upon which his opinion is based. In Brown, despite
long and thoughtful opinions by both the majority and the dissent, the
two arguments concerning the applicability of Rule 703 never met be-
cause each used an, entirely different characterization of the witness'
testimony. The dissent discussed the application of Rule 703 to an ac-
countant's expert opinion based on documents and hearsay.72 The ma-
jority considered the same testimony merely the repetition by the
accountant of out of court accusations made by the defendant's former
clients.73
III. THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE DOES NOT BAR TESTIMONY BY AN
EXPERT WITNESS CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF
WRITINGS, RECORDINGS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS
UPON WHICH His OPINION Is BASED
Under pre-Code law, testimony by an expert witness as to either
tence of Rule 703 (or § 2703) would be trustworthy enough to satisfy the demands of the confron-
tation clause.
66. 548 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1977).
67. Id. at 1206 n.22.
68. Id. at 1212-13 (Gee, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1198. But see id. 1210-11 (Gee, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1208.
71. Id. at 1207-08.
72. Id. at 1212 (Gee, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 1206 n.22.
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his opinion based upon documents not in evidence, or his opinion as to
the contents of those documents, would not only have been a violation
of the rule requiring personal knowledge and the rule against hearsay
but it would also have violated the best evidence rule. The best evi-
dence rule is based upon the theory that a writing, recording, or photo-
graph is the "best evidence" of its own contents. The rule prohibits the
use of substitutes, such as mere testimony, to describe the contents of a
writing, recording, or photograph unless the original is shown to be
unavailable.74 The Code adopts a best evidence rule in section 3002,
which provides that "[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording or
photograph, the original writing, recording or photograph is required
except as otherwise provided in this Code or by other statutes." Section
2703 is, however, one of the "as otherwise provided in this Code" ex-
ceptions to the best evidence rule. The Federal Advisory Committee's
Note to the corresponding Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 1002, points
this out. "It should be noted, however, that [the Federal Rule of Evi-
dence corresponding to section 2703] allows an expert to give an opin-
ion based on matters not in evidence, and the present rule must be read
as being limited accordingly in its application."75 The Committee went
on to apply the same exception to experts who were not even witnesses.
"Hospital records which may be admitted as business records under
Rule 803(6) commonly contain reports interpreting X-rays by the staff
radiologist, who qualifies as an expert, and these reports need not be
excluded from the records by the instant rule. 7 6
It is clear both from these comments by the Federal Advisory
Committee and from the language of section 2703 itself that section
2703 is an exception to the best evidence rule. The only possible ques-
tion is whether that exception applies to both the experts' opinions and
the written, photographed, and recorded facts upon which those opin-
ions are based, or only to the opinions themselves. This question
presents the same issues as the question of whether the hearsay excep-
tion created by section 2703 applies to both opinions and the facts upon
which they are based, or only to the opinions themselves. The answer
to both questions must be the same, and in both situations it is unrea-
74. 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, §§ 1177, 1178 & 1183 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1972); MCoRMICK,
supra note 17, § 230, 231; Proposed Federal Rules supra note 5, at 342; Proposed Code, supra note
4, at 2658.
75. Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 5, at 343.
76. Id.
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sonable to read section 2703 to authorize only the introduction of the
opinions themselves.
It is only because the Code changes pre-existing law that it is even
possible to speak of admitting an expert's opinion into evidence with-
out the facts upon which it is based. Under pre-Code law, an expert's
opinion which did not appear to be based either upon personal knowl-
edge, or evidence introduced into the record was insufficient to uphold
a finding by the trir of fact." The Oklahoma Evidence Code has
changed this. Under section 2705, the expert witness need not state the
basis of his opinion unless one of the parties chooses to bring out that
basis or the judge chooses to require that it be brought out.78 Since
section 2703 authorizes expert witness testimony based upon facts that
need not be in evidence, it is possible under the Code to introduce
proper expert testimony that is not supported by any evidence whatso-
ever in the record. These sections compel a reversal of the pre-Code
rule on the sufficiency of unsupported expert opinion. Such an opin-
ion, (f it is admitted, must be considered sufficient to support a finding
by the trier of fact. Any other result would make meaningless the
changes of law adopted in sections 2703 and 2705 and turn those sec-
tions into traps for parties who relied upon those changes.
This does not mean, however, that under the Code, testimony by
expert witnesses ought to consist of unsupported and unexplained state-
ments of opinion made by those experts. An unsupported and unex-
plained expert opinion is not very persuasive.7 9 It would take an
unusual combination of decisions, by the parties and the trial court, to
produce a trial in which such unsupported statements of expert opinion
would form an important part of the evidence. In most cases in which
the trial judge exercises his discretion under section 2705 and permits
the use of expert opinion without prior disclosure of the foundation for
that opinion, the parties will introduce those portions of the foundation
they think will be persuasive to the trier of fact. The purpose of the
provisions in section 2705 which would permit the use of unsupported
statements of expert opinion is not to exclude evidence of the founda-
tion, but to free the parties to use only those portions of the foundation
which will be persuasive.
It is barely possible under the Code, therefore, to argue for an in-
terpretation of section 2703 under which expert opinions based upon
77. See 2 J. WIrMoRE, EVIDENCE § 676 (3d ed. 1940).
78. See discussion in text accompanying notes 26-33 supra.
79. See authorities cited in note 35 su.pra.
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facts not in evidence would be admissible, but the facts upon which
they were based would not be admissible. Such an interpretation
would make no practical sense. The opinion evidence would not be
persuasive, and parties would use such a device only as a last resort.
Section 2703 must be read, therefore, as creating both a hearsay excep-
tion, and an exception to the best evidence rule for any facts not in
evidence which form the basis of an expert opinion and which satisfy
the requirement of section 2703 that they be "of a type reasonably re-
lied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or infer-
ences upon the subject."
The creation of such an exception to the best evidence rule is par-
ticularly appropriate with respect to the scientific and medical informa-
tion dealt with by the second sentence of section 2703. The theory of
the best evidence rule is that a writing, recording, or photograph is the
"best evidence" of its own contents,80 but frequently that is not true
with respect to scientific and medical records. They typically require
interpretation by expert witnesses.
A case decided by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 1967, Fuller
v. Lemmons,1 illustrates this problem. In that case, the plaintiff
claimed that she had suffered personal injuries in an automobile acci-
dent and recovered a judgment at trial.82 The Supreme Court ordered
a new trial on the sole issue of damages because plaintiffs medical wit-
ness had based his opinion upon X-rays which had not been admitted
in evidence.83 The Supreme Court held that the admission of the doc-
tor's testimony, without the X-rays, violated a rule which combined the
best evidence rule and the pre-Code requirement that an expert's opin-
ion be based on facts in evidence, or within the expert's personal
knowledge. The majority stated:
A medical expert must always predicate his opinions on cer-
tain premises of fact. It is apparent that the medical expert
based his opinion of the condition of the injured vertebrae on
the x-ray, which is the best evidence of what it shows. There-
fore, the opinion, based on an x-ray not in evidence, has no
foundation upon which it may be predicated. The general
rule, well established, that the opinion of an expert must be
based on evidence, which rule permits the jury to consider the
expert opinion in relation to the facts upon which it is based,
80. McCoRMIcK, supra note 17, § 231.
81. 434 P.2d 145 (Okla. 1967).
82. Id. at 145.
83. Id. at 146-47.
[Vol. 16:1
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 16 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss1/1
18F]HRSA Y
applies to a medical expert testifying in regard to his opinion
based on an x-ray. The opinion of the medical expert, based
on an x-ray, is not admissible until the x-ray has been admit-
ted into evidence.8 4
The medical expert had testified on direct as to the extent of the
plaintiff's injuries without making any reference to X-rays. Defense
counsel brought up the question of X-rays during the direct examina-
tion both by an objection to testimony by the expert without the intro-
duction of X-rays and a request for leave to ask a "preliminary
question" as to whether the doctor took X-rays. 5 On cross-examina-
tion defense counsel brought out that X-rays had been taken and that
the medical expert had used them in reaching his conclusions and then
moved to strike the testimony of the expert witness. At about this point
plaintiff's counsel began to "offer" the X-rays, which were present in
the courtroom, to defense counsel rather than offering them in evi-
dence.8 6
Justices Hodges and Williams dissented from the decision. One of
the arguments which Justice Williams made in his dissent was that the
offer of the X-rays to defense counsel should be enough to satisfy past
Oklahoma case law. Justice Williams pointed out that defense counsel
had not questioned either the authenticity or the interpretation of the
X-rays. 7 With respect to the fact that the X-rays were not introduced
in evidence he went on to say:
From the facts and circumstances present in the instant
case, it is my view that a reversal of the verdict below on the
sole ground that the X-rays used by plaintiff's medical witness
to formulate his opinion of the extent of her injuries were not
formally introduced in evidence, is not warranted. X-ray
medical photographs are capable of being interpreted, except
in the rarest of cases, only by a trained physician or techni-
cian, and by themselves, such X-rays are of no aid to a jury, a
trial judge, or to an appellate court in their determination of
whether a party is suffering from an alleged injury.88
I suggest that Justice Williams correctly identified the important
considerations in cases such as Fuller. It makes no sense to require that
meaningless evidence, such as X-rays, be introduced into evidence.
84. Id. at 147.
85. Id. at 146.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 149 (Williams, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
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There is a real need to ensure that the opposing party has an adequate
opportunity to investigate both the authenticity and the interpretation
of such evidence.89
The best way to provide opportunities for such investigation is to
permit full discovery prior to trial. Two years after Fuller was decided,
however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that then existing
Oklahoma law did not give the opposing party in a personal injury suit
the right to discover information possessed by a plaintiff's doctor. Un-
der Avery v. Nelson,90 a personal injury plaintiff could claim the pa-
tient-physician privilege up until the moment he took the stand at the
trial itself. A later section of this article discusses how the Code has
solved that problem.91
Requirements that a party produce all the evidence at trial are not,
however, a very good substitute for full discovery. One of the defense
counsel in Fuller illustrated this point. When both plaintiffs counsel
and the trial judge began to offer him an opportunity to examine the X-
rays he responded, "I can't examine x-rays. I don't know anything
about them." 92
IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF SECTION 2703 AS A
HEARSAY EXCEPTION
Two Oklahoma Evidence Code sections limit the introduction of
hearsay information through an expert witness. These are section 2703
itself and section 2403.
A. Section 2403 Limits the Use of Section 2703 as a Hearsay
Exception
Section 2403 limits the use of all kinds of evidence. That section
provides that relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence, or unfair and harmful surprise.""
89. Although Justice Hodges was willing to join the majority in requiring that X-rays be
offered in evidence when medical testimony was based upon them in future cases, he dissented in
Fuller v. Lemmons because in his opinion prior case law required no more than that such X-rays
be produced for inspection. Id. at 149.
90. 455 P.2d 75 (Okla. 1969).
- 91. See text accompanying notes 113 through 126 ifa.
92. 434 P.2d 145, 146 (Okla. 1967).
93. See Iniroduction 1, supra note 20, at 243-47; OKLAHoMA EVIDENCE HANDBOOK, supra
note 34 § 2403, at 67-69.
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Out of court information, which satisfies the requirements of sec-
tion 2703, might be excluded under section 2403 as cumulative or un-
fairly prejudicial just as any other evidence offered to support an expert
opinion might be excluded under section 2403 for those same reasons.
It is extremely unlikely, however, that a court would rule that the pro-
bative value of out of court information was substantially outweighed
by any prejudicial effect if the information were essential to provide a
basis for expert opinion. When there is other evidence to form a basis
for expert opinion, it will be easier for a court to exclude a particular
piece of information as unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or needlessly
cumulative. In a case in which there was abundant evidence intro-
duced to support an opinion, all testimony concerning facts not in evi-
dence might well be unnecessarily cumulative evidence.
B. Limitations Created by Section 2703 Itsef
1. The Hearsay Exception Created by Section 2703 Is Not
Limited to Otherwise Inadmissible Evidence
The most important use of the hearsay exception created by sec-
tion 2703 will be to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence, but the ex-
ception also covers other facts not in evidence upon which an expert
witness relies, if those facts satisfy the requirements of the second sen-
tence of section 2703, even though they would be admissible in evi-
dence. Indeed, facts already in evidence would qualify if they satisfy
the requirements of that second sentence.
The restrictions on cumulative evidence set forth in section 2403
would apply if a party tried to use section 2703 to repetitiously prove
the same facts. But section 2703 can be used to permit an expert to
include facts that have already been introduced in evidence in an ex-
planation of his opinion, and the section can also be used to introduce
hearsay which might have been introduced in some other way.
2. Section 2703 Requires Both Reliance by Experts in the
Particular Field and That the Reliance Be
Reasonable
Professor Rothstein raises the question whether experts in a par-
ticular field must "customarily" 94 rely upon a type of fact in order for
that type to qualify. Federal Rule 703 and section 2703 stop just short
94. RomSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 43, at 84; ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES, supra
note 35, at 290.
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of requiring customary use. Federal Rule 703 was amended between
the 1969 draft95 and the 1971 draft96 to add the restriction "in the par-
ticular field." The obvious purpose of the change was to focus atten-
tion on the question whether other experts would use facts or data in
the way in which the expert, who is now a witness, is seeking to use
them. The change means that it is not enough that the trial judge be
convinced that this particular expert witness is being reasonable in bas-
ing his opinion on certain facts; other persons in the same field must
also rely on the same type of facts in forming similar opinions. One
might wonder, in the abstract, whether this is a desirable restriction,
but it will not turn out to be a very serious restriction because it does
not require that the use of a certain type of facts be customary. The
only experts who cannot satisfy this requirement will be those who
want to use methods that practically no one else in their fields would
use.
The major requirement in the second sentence of section 2703 and
Federal Rule 703 is that reliance by the expert upon his facts be reason-
able. Reasonableness is ultimately a decision that the trial judge must
make. Neither legal rules nor the comments of the draftsmen will be of
much assistance to the trial judge in making this decision. The Federal
Advisory Committee's one example of how Rule 703 would be applied
was a statement that "the opinion of an 'accidentologist' as to the point
of impact in an automobile collision based on statements of bystand-
ers,"' 97 would not satisfy the requirements of the rule. This has been
disputed by several commentators.98
Weinstein and Berger go even further than the Advisory Commit-
tee's comment on accidentologists when they suggest that an expert
opinion should not be accepted as "reasonable" if it is used only in
preparing for litigation.99 While preparation for litigation would be a
factor the trial judge should consider, Weinstein and Berger go much
95. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and
Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 315 (1969).
96. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magis-
trates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 404 (1971).
97. Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 5, at 284.
98. 11 J. MooRE & H. BENDIX, Mooit's FEDERAL PRAcncE 1 703.1013] (1976); ROTHSTEIN,
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 43, at 82; and Note, Admissibility ofan Expert Opinion Based on
Inadmissible Hearsay, 32 OKLA. L. REv. 444, 450, 452 (1979). See also McElhaney, supra note 20,
at 484-86, and WEINSTmIN & BERGER supra note 17, 703[02] n.7.
99. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, 703[03] at 703-17.
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too far in suggesting that none of the procedures developed for litiga-
tion involving experts can ever satisfy the requirements of Rule 703
and section 2703. Professor McElhaney makes the opposite point.
Many of the procedures which are reasonable under the circumstances
in which they are used may not be reliable enough to admit into the
courtroom. He points out that "[a] medical doctor making an emer-
gency diagnosis at the scene of an accident will not use the same stan-
dards of reliability as he did in the research laboratory he left just
before starting home." 1"
The commentators agree"'1 with Professor McElhaney that ulti-
mately, "[t]he standard of reasonableness that the judge should apply is
the judicial one, looking at the expert's field for guidance but not for
ultimate decision."' 0 2 The commentators do suggest that the judge can
learn a great deal about the reasonableness and trustworthiness of the
expert's procedures from the experts. 10 3 Indeed, some of them suggest
something close to deference to the expert's opinion of his own proce-
dures."° For example, Louisell and Mueller suggest:
Frequently, however, determining the reasonableness of re-
liance upon underlying data is itself a task requiring knowl-
edge of the sort judges do not commonly have. Particularly
when the expert is a highly educated and sophisticated analyst
in a technical field, the trial judge should limit his role: He
should make certain that the expert is in fact adequately qual-
ified, but should accord considerable weight to any assurance
by him that the underlying data are indeed adequate, in terms
of both quality and quantity.0 5
Judges and trial lawyers will recognize this situation. It is the
same situation that already exists with respect to the questions of
whether a particular person is an expert witness and whether he has an
expert opinion that is likely to be helpful to the trier of fact. In each
situation the trial court judge has power to decide the questions of fact,
but he may not have a mastery of the facts themselves. In theory, all of
these questions of fact concerning expert witnesses are resolved after
the parties present the facts to the judge. The parties, however, fre-
100. McElhaney, supra note 20, at 486.
101. WEINSTEIN & BEROER, supra note 17, 1 703101] at 702-6; SALTZBURG & REDDEN, SUpra
note 43, at 426; LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 17 § 389, at 663.
102. McElhaney, supra note 20, at 486.
103. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 17 § 389, at 662; SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note
43, at 426; WEINSTEIN & BEaGE, supra note 17, 1 703[031, at 703-17.
104. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 17 § 389, at 662.
105. Id.
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quently fail to present the facts clearly to the judge, thereby forcing him
to decide on the basis of personal presumptions. Thus, witnesses he
would expect to be qualified, such as medical doctors, are treated as
qualified unless the opposing party can show reasons why they should
not be so treated.
The Evidence Code does not attempt to change that situation. In-
stead it enables parties to forego formal factual proof which is not ex-
pected to be persuasive. While the trial judge will have the power to
decide whether an expert witness' decision to base his opinion on a fact
not yet in evidence is reasonable, he may not have the information to
make that decision. Under the forms of proof which the judge may
permit under sections 2703 and 2705, he may not even know that the
expert is basing his opinion upon a fact that is not in evidence.
The key to the whole system is that the parties are given a much
wider choice as to whether to offer evidence or whether to oppose it. In
order to make use of that choice, the parties need to come to court
knowing which questions concerning expert witness testimony are
worth raising.
3. The Need for Full Discovery and the Special Problem of the
Patient-Physician Privilege Under the 1980
Amendment to Oklahoma Evidence Code
Section 2503
The flexibility which sections 2703 and 2705 offer will work best in
cases in which the parties have been able to conduct full discovery
prior to trial. Discovery does not have to be conducted using the most
expensive procedures. Weinstein and Berger point out that adequate
disclosure of experts' opinions can often be achieved by an exchange of
experts' reports and summaries of their testimony. °6 Judge Weinstein
and Professor Berger state that "[t]his practice should be standard at
any pretrial conference.""0 7 Nevertheless, there will be many cases in
which one, or both parties, will not have conducted adequate discovery
with respect to potential expert testimony. The trial judge can protect
such parties from the dangers to which their lack of discovery exposes
them, and he should do so if their failure can be excused because dis-
covery was impossible10 8 or too expensive'0 9 considering the circum-
106. WEINsTEIN & BERGER, supra note 17, 705[01].
107. Id.
108. RoTHsTErN, FEDERAL RULES, supra note 35, at 293. Weinstein and Berger point out that
because of the much narrower scope of discovery in criminal cases "an attorney will be less likely
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stances of the case.
Under section 2705 the trial judge has complete discretion to re-
quire that a foundation be laid before an expert opinion is admitted.
Normally, the trial judge should not impose such a requirement unless
the opposing party can suggest a good reason to do so."' An excusable
failure to conduct discovery can be such a reason.
It will be more difficult to protect a party who has not conducted
discovery against the effects of section 2703. There are two things,
however, which the trial judge can do. First, he can rigorously require
proof that the expert's reliance is reasonable. That requirement is
likely to be overlooked"' unless the opposing party raises particular
questions about the expert's testimony, and a party who has not con-
ducted discovery is unlikely to be able to do so. Secondly, the judge
can require that the question of the reasonableness of the expert's reli-
ance on facts not in evidence be considered" 2 in a voir dire hearing
outside the presence of the jury. Voir dire hearings slow down a trial,
but may well be appropriate whenever a question arises about the rea-
sonableness of an expert's use of facts not in evidence. If the opinion,
and those facts upon which it is based, are ultimately admitted, the jury
will have to decide the similar question of whether the expert's methods
to have sufficient advance knowledge for effective cross-examination." WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 17, 705101] at 705-9.
109. Rules 703 and 705 contemplate that trial lawyers will know the bases for expert
opinions in advance of trial by having used ordinary means of discovery. This is a posi-
tion which reflects current academic thought; complete discovery is felt to be good, just
as forum-shopping is thought to be bad. At the same time, there is a growing concern
among thoughtful practitioners that exhaustive discovery may do more harm than good,
one of its undeniable effects is to cause considerable delay.
McElhaney, supra note 20, at 489.
110. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
11I. See the discussion in the text following note 105 supra of the fact that many factual issues
concerning expert testimony are not pressed to a point at which the trial court judge can make a
factually based decision.
112. Saltzburg and Redden point out the variety of proof that can be considered on this ques-
tion.
Just as a witness may himself establish personal knowledge about an event that is the
subject of his testimony, it appears that an expert witness should be able to lay a founda-
tion that establishes the reasonableness of the basis of his opinion.. In other words, if a
psychiatrist is called to testify as to the sanity of a criminal defendant, and if the psychia-
trist indicates that his opinion is based in part on reports by school officials, the psychia-
trist should be able also to testify that such reports are ordinarily used and relied upon
by other psychiatrists in making psychiatric diagnoses. Of course, it should be permissi-
ble for opposing counsel to introduce evidence to the contrary. The trial judge will ulti-
mately have to decide whether the basis of the opinion is of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts on the basis of what he learns from the experts produced by the parties,
from the written material which the experts authenticate under Rule 803(18), or by tak-
ing judicial notice.
SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 43, at 426.
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are persuasive. The jury, however, does not have the same freedom to
consider inadmissible evidence that the judge does under both section
2103(B)(1) and section 2703. A voir dire hearing will give the party
opposing the introduction of the expert's evidence an opportunity to
conduct some belated discovery, without exposing the jury to informa-
tin that is not even admissible under section 2703. It seems clear, how-
ever, that when a party opposes the introduction of evidence under
section 2703 there is no adequate substitute for full prior discovery of
the relevant facts.
It was, therefore, extremely important that section 2503 of the
Oklahoma Evidence Code eliminated a barrier to the discovery of in-
formation concerning plaintiffs' medical treatment in personal injury
actions. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma had held in Avery v. Nel-
son 113 that the physician-patient privilege created by the then existing
Oklahoma statute" 4 was not waived until a plaintiff patient took the
stand as a witness at the trial.1
5
Under section 2503(D)(3) of the Oklahoma Evidence Code, as
adopted in 1978,116 a patient who brought a personal injury action
would waive the physician-patient privilege with respect to any physi-
cal, mental, or emotional condition constituting an element of his
claim." 7 Former section 2503(D)(3) of the 1978 Code provided:
There is no privilege under this Code as to a communica-
tion relevant to the physical, mental or emotional condition of
the patient in any proceeding in which the patient relies upon
that condition as an element of his claim or defense or, after
the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any party re-
lies upon the condition as an element of his claim of de-
fense. 1 8
This language does not use the word "waiver," but its effect is to com-
pel a party bringing a lawsuit in which a medical condition is an ele-
ment of his claim to lose the physician-patient privilege with respect to
113. 455 P.2d 75 (Okla. 1969).
114. Former OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 385(6); Act of March 12, 1953, ch. 9, § 1, 1953 Okla. Sess.
Laws (repealed 1977). From October 1, 1977 to October 1, 1978, former OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 418,
Act of June 21, 1977, ch. 265, 1977 Okla. Sess. Laws (repealed 1978) was in effect. It contained all
of former OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 2503, Act of May 10, 1978, ch. 285 § 503, 1978 Sess. Laws
(amended 1980) except for the waiver provision for a condition which is an element of a claim or
defense in the proceeding.
115. Avery v. Nelson, 455 P.2d 75, 77-79 (Okla. 1969).
116. Act of May 10, 1978, ch. 285, § 503, 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws (amended 1980).
117. See Introduction 1, supra note 20, at 290-91.
118. Act of May 10, 1978, ch. 285, § 503, 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws (amended 1980).
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that condition in that proceeding. The bringing of the lawsuit would be
an "automatic" waiver of the privilege.1 19 This provision, therefore,
made possible pretrial discovery with respect to the physicians who had
treated the plaintiff in a personal injury case. Furthermore, the fact
that such discovery would be available would give plaintiffs increased
incentive to agree to informal exchanges of information that would be
less costly than formal discovery.
In 1980, section 2503(D)(3) was amended 120 to provide an express
authorization for "statutory discovery." Section 2503(D)(3) now pro-
vides:
The privilege under this Code as to a communication rel-
evant to the physical, mental or emotional condition of the
patient in any proceeding in which the patient relies upon that
condition as an element of his claim or defense or, after the
patient's death, in any proceeding in which any party relies
upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense, is
qualified to the extent that an adverse party in said proceed-
ing may obtain relevant information regarding said condition
by statutory discovery. 2 1
The purpose of this amendment is not apparent. The draftsmen of
this amendment may have thought that the original version of section
2503(D)(3) was not sufficiently clear in authorizing pretrial discovery.
Both versions of the section authorize the use of discovery in the same
circumstances. The "restriction" of discovery to "statutory discovery"
under the amended section does not appear to be significant. Under
both the original and amended versions of section 2503(D)(3), a patient
wishing to use a medical condition as an element of a claim or a de-
fense in a legal proceeding is compelled to waive his privilege against
pretrial discovery with respect to the physicians who treated that condi-
tion. Under both versions, the privilege would apparently end with re-
spect to discovery at the moment a personal injury plaintiff begins his
lawsuit.
The fact that amended section 2305(D)(3) provides that the privi-
lege is only "qualified to the extent that an adverse party . . . may
obtain relevant evidence. . . by statutory discovery" may create a se-
ries of new problems. The amended section does not say whether a
waiver of the privilege would occur if the patient himself gives volun-
119. See Introduction I, supra note 20, at 291.
120. Act of April 10, 1980, ch. 113, § 1, 1980 Okla. Sess. Laws.
121. Id.
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tary testimony at the trial concerning the condition, or calls other phy-
sicians to testify concerning that condition. Under former section
385(6),122 the privilege was waived if the patient offered himself, or an-
other physician, as a witness. Under the original section 2503(D)(3),
the question of waiver at trial did not arise because the entire privilege
ended, for purposes of the lawsuit, as soon as the lawsuit was filed.
It clearly would make sense to hold that testimony by the patient,
or by any other witness called by the patient at trial concerning the
condition, waives the privilege with respect to all other communica-
tions by the patient concerning the condition. The Code would appear
to leave the Oklahoma courts free to adopt this position either as a
matter of interpretation, or as a common law rule, 123 and they should
do so.
12 4
If neither the Oklahoma courts, nor the legislature, adopt a rule
providing for waiver of the privilege by the patient's testimony or that
of his witnesses concerning the condition at trial, amended section
2503(D)(3) appears to provide that the privilege would continue except
to the extent that the adverse party has conducted pretrial discovery.
Under this interpretation, if one of the plaintiffs physicians had been
deposed, that physician could be called to the stand and questioned
about privileged communications with the plaintiff,1 25 but another of
the plaintiffs physicians, who had not been subjected to any discovery,
could not be called at all. In a complicated case, there might be argu-
ments that only some of the privileged communications with a particu-
lar physician had been brought out by discovery, and that the other
communications with that physician remained privileged.
If this interpretation of section 2503(D)(3) is adopted, it would cre-
ate great pressure upon adverse parties to conduct all possible discov-
ery with respect to privileged medical treatment. Furthermore, the
"statutory discovery" necessary to satisfy section 2503(D)(3) would be
122. Act of March 12, 1953, ch. 9, § 1, 1953 Okla. Sess. Laws (repealed 1977).
123. See MCCORMICK, supra note 17, § 103; 8 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2389(2) (McNaugh-
ton rev. 1961). Wigmore states:
Certainly it is a spectacle fit to increase the layman's traditional contempt for the
chicanery of the law when a plaintiff describes at length to the jury and a crowded court-
room the details of his supposed ailment and then is permitted to suppress the available
proof of his falsities by asserting that he wishes to keep the matter confidential.
Id.
124. In any event, statements by the patient disclosing any significant part of his communica-
tions to a physician will waive the privilege with respect to that physician under § 2511 of the
Oklahoma Evidence Code.
125. The section does appear to permit normal, live witness testimony about the matters which
have been covered by statutory discovery.
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an expensive form of discovery. Defendants might feel compelled to
take depositions of physicians, rather than exchange reports. There is,
however, a possible solution to this problem. The patient himself al-
ways retains a right to waive the privilege,126 and he may well choose to
do so rather than go through the expense of discovery. Indeed, a deci-
sion by the patient to turn over his medical reports may be all the
waiver that is necessary. Defense counsel will generally prefer express
agreements waiving all physician-patient privileges.
If a plaintiff in a personal injury case refuses to waive the physi-
cian-patient privilege with respect to his condition, then the defendant
will be compelled to use "statutory discovery," and this will be expen-
sive. The only form of discovery provided by Oklahoma statutes,
which can be used to obtain information from persons who are not
parties, is the oral deposition. 127 Written interrogatories,1 28 and mo-
tions to produce can'29 be directed only to parties.
In many cases, the adverse party would want to depose the plain-
tiff's physicians in any event and the requirements of amended section
2503(D)(3) will not lead to any difficulties in those cases. In other
cases, the adverse party will take the depositions of physicians who
would not have been deposed, except for the provisions of amended
section 2503(D)(3). Some of those depositions will probably be very
short and formal. There may be cases, however, in which an adverse
party realizes during the course of trial that calling one of the plaintifs
physicians whom he did not depose would be desirable or necessary.
Even in that situation the possibility of meeting the formal requirement
of "statutory discovery" exists, especially if the trial judge can be per-
suaded that the failure to depose a particular physician was reasonable
under the circumstances, and that a continuance should be granted.130
Therefore, there will only be a few cases in which the amended section
2503(D)(3) will deprive a party of evidence that should have been
available, and a somewhat larger group of cases in which the section
will force the parties to bear the expense of taking depositions which
126. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2511 (Supp. 1979) provides that, "a person upon whom this Code
cpnfers a privilege against disclosure waives the privilege if he or his predecessor voluntarily dis-
closes or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter. This section does
not apply if the disclosure itself is privileged."
127. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 423, 435, 436 (1971) and §§ 433, 441 (Supp. 1979).
128. Id. § 549 (Supp. 1979).
129. Id. § 548.
130. See Herbert v. Chicago, RI. & Pac. R.R, 544 P.2d 898 (Okla. 1969). However, in that
case the defendant had no right to take the deposition of the absent doctor until the plaintiff took
the stand at the trial.
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were not felt necessary. Nevertheless, there is no justification for the
restriction which that section seems to impose and a broader waiver
rule should be adopted.
V. WHAT IS THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF OTHERWISE INADMISSIBLE
HEARSAY ADMITTED UNDER SECTION 2703?
The suggestion has been made that the introduction of otherwise
inadmissible facts upon which an expert's opinion is based should be
permitted only for the limited purpose of explaining the expert's opin-
ion, and that such facts should not be considered to be substantive evi-
dence. Saltzburg and Redden argue that "[e]vidence not otherwise
admissible is not admitted under this Rule for its truth; it is admitted to
explain the bases of the expert opinion. A limiting instruction often
should be required to explain this to the jury." 3 ' McElhaney also
states that the cross-examiner should be entitled to such a limiting in-
struction, but he suggests that, in all but the most unusual situations, "a
request for such an instruction would be a mistake."' 32 Alaska Rule of
Evidence 705(c) provides that, when facts or data are disclosed before
the jury which "would be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
other than to explain or support the expert's opinion or inference," the
court, upon request, is to give a limiting instruction.'33
The Alaskan rule and other discussions of this problem describe
the evidence admitted, under a rule such as section 2703, as "otherwise
inadmissible" evidence. This is accurate only in the sense that the evi-
dence can be admitted under such a rule which has not been shown to
be otherwise admissible. Much of this evidence could have been ad-
mitted in other ways but, "only with the expenditure of substantial time
in producing and examining various authenticating witnesses."' 134
Other items of evidence might not be admissible in the absence of a
rule such as section 2703. It is impossible, however, for a court to draw
an effective distinction between evidence admitted under this rule, but
which could have been admitted in some other way if the party offering
it had called additional witnesses and offered additional foundation,
and the truly "otherwise inadmissible" evidence which could only be
admitted under this rule. The only distinction that a court can draw is
131. SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 43, at 427.
132. McElhaney, supra note 20, at 482 n.83.
133. ALAsKA RULE OF EVIDENCE 705(c) (quoted in LOUISELL & MUELLM, supra note 17,
§ 399 (Supp. 1980)).
134. Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 5, at 283.
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one based on the record before it. This distinction will be between evi-
dence for which the record shows an alternate basis for admission and
evidence for which the record does not show any basis for admission. 135
One commentator 136 argues that otherwise inadmissible statements
introduced as the basis of an expert witness' opinion under sections
2703 and 2705 are not substantive evidence.
While an expert may be required to state the basis for his
opinion, 12 Okla. Stat. § 2705 (Supp. 1978), where an expert
has based his opinion on the out-of-court statements of others
and he discloses these statements at trial, the statements are
not actually hearsay because they are not being offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. They are being offered
as the basis of the expert's testimony. Courts often overlook
this distinction. The difficulty is that jurors may be unable to
distinguish the limited grounds for admitting the evidence
and may mistakenly consider the evidence substantively. 3
7
There are two reasons why otherwise inadmissible evidence admit-
ted under a rule such as section 2703 should be considered substantive
evidence. The first is merely persuasive; the second is conclusive.
First, the creation of a new limited use device for the admission of
hearsay is inconsistent with the overall approach of the Oklahoma Evi-
dence Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence to such devices. Since
the Code and the Rules do not state that they are creating a hearsay
exception for otherwise inadmissible facts reasonably relied upon by
experts, they do not reveal whether that exception should be a limited
use exception. The Code and the Rules, however, generally reject the
idea of limited use hearsay exceptions. Insofar as the draftsmen could,
they turned the common law limited use hearsay exceptions into com-
plete hearsay exceptions. Thus, the common law rule permitting the
introduction of learned treatises solely for purposes of impeachment
was expanded into a full substantive exception. 38 Similarly, limited
use exceptions for some prior consistent statements139 and statements to
135. See text accompanying notes 52 & 53 supra.
136. Note, Admissibility of an Expert Opinion Based on Inadmissible Hearsay, 32 OKLA. L.
REv. 444 (1979).
137. Id. at 445 n.6.
138. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2803(18) (1980). See OKi.AHOMA EVIDENCE HANDBOOK, supra
note 34 § 2803(18), at 232; Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 5, at 316-17; and Proposed Code,
supra note 4, at 2650.
139. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2801(4)(a)(2) (1980). See Introduction 11, supra note 3, at 677-80.
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nontreating physicians"4 became full substantive exceptions. The
Code did not abolish limited admissibility. Section 2106 expressly rec-
ognizes that evidence may be admissible for one purpose but not for
another, and it provides for appropriate limiting instructions to the
jury. Prior inconsistent statements by a witness that do not satisfy the
requirements of section 2801(4)(a)(1) remain admissible for the limited
purpose of impeachment,1 41 but this reflects a congressional defeat142
suffered by the draftsmen of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.
Prior inconsistent statements by a witness that do satisfy the require-
ments of section 801(4)(a)(1) are admissible for full substantive use. 143
Moreover, the comments by the Federal Advisory Committee
which drafted the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence demonstrate a
conviction on the part of the draftsmen that limited use hearsay excep-
tions would not work. In commenting on Proposed Federal Evidence
Rule 803(18) the Advisory Committee stated: "Moreover, the rule
avoids the unreality of admitting evidence for the purpose of impeach-
ment only, with an instruction to the jury not to consider it otherwise.
The parallel to the treatment of prior inconsistent statements will be
apparent."'" Similarly, the Advisory Committee commented with re-
spect to the problem of statements to nontreating physicians who were
to testify as expert witnesses:
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay excep-
tion, as not within its guarantee of truthfulness, statements to
a physician, consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to
testify. While these statements were not admissible as sub-
stantive evidence, the expert was allowed to state the basis of
his opinion, including statements of this kind. The distinction
thus called for was one most unlikely to be made by juries.
The rule accordingly rejects the limitation. This position is
consistent with the provision of Rule 703 that the facts on
which expert testimony is based need not be admissible in evi-
dence if of a kind ordinarily relied upon by experts in the
field. 14 5
Therefore, a decision that otherwise inadmissible evidence admit-
ted under section 2703 was not substantive would be inconsistent with
140. Id. § 2803(4) (1980). See comment by Federal Advisory Committee, Proposed Federal
Rules, supra note 5, at 306, quoted in text at note 145 infra.
141. Introduction II, supra note 3, at 661.
142. 11 J. MooRE & H. BENDIX, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 801.01[4] (1976).
143. Introduction II, supra note 3, at 659-61.
144. Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 5, at 317.
145. Id. at 306.
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the general rejection of limited use exceptions to the hearsay rule by
both the Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence.146 This should be a
persuasive argument, if it were possible to make a choice as to whether
such evidence should be considered substantive. There is, however, no
choice to be made. The second reason why such evidence should be
considered to be substantive is that the purpose for which it is admitted
is clearly substantive.
Limited use exceptions to the rule against hearsay are only possi-
ble in those situations where there is a limited nonhearsay nonsubstan-
tive purpose for which a particular out-of-court statement can be used.
At common law, a prior statement by a witness might be admissible for
the limited nonhearsay and nonsubstantive purpose of showing that the
witness had been either consistent 147 or inconsistent. 14  Similarly, at
both common law149 and under the Code,150 in a case containing an
issue whether notice of a fact was given, an out of court statement inad-
missible under the rule against hearsay might be admissible for the lim-
ited nonhearsay purpose of showing that notice was given.
There is no nonhearsay and nonsubstantive purpose for which we
can use otherwise inadmissible evidence which is admitted under sec-
tion 2703. Furthermore, the purpose for which such evidence must be
used is a substantive hearsay use. Consider the following hypothetical:
An expert witness having no personal knowledge of the facts of a case
is called to the witness stand. He has read a report of a medical exami-
nation which is not in evidence and which states that a particular fact is
true. No evidence has been introduced at the trial to show that the
particular fact is true. The trial judge finds that it is both reasonable
and customary in this expert's field to rely upon that medical examina-
tion report as establishing that fact. The expert testifies, "I have
reached a certain conclusion. My conclusion is based upon the particu-
lar fact that I read in the medical examination report that is not in
evidence." It should be clear that the trier of fact can adopt the expert's
conclusion only if it can accept, as true, the particular fact upon which
the conclusion is based. This means that the medical examination re-
port concerning the particular fact is being used for a hearsay purpose,
and as substantive evidence.
146. See McElhaney, supra note 20, at 482 n.83.
147. 4 J. WIGMOpF, EvIDENCE §§ 1128, 1129, 1132 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1972).
148. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1018 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1970); McCoRMIcK, supra note 17,
§ 34.
149. LILLY, supra note 34, at 164-66.
150. Introduction II, supra note 3, at 643.
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The argument to the contrary is based upon the assumption that
there exists some alternative way of using such evidence which is vari-
ously described as using the evidence "to explain the bases of the expert
opinion," '151 "to explain or support the expert's opinion or infer-
ence," 152 "as the basis of the expert's opinion,' ' t53 or as evidence that
"comes in only as the basis of the opinion, to help evaluate the opin-
ion." 154 Theoretically, it would be possible to admit a statement for the
limited purpose of explaining facts already in evidence; 55 but, in the
cases with which we are dealing, there is nothing in evidence to be
explained. The evidence with which we are dealing is necessary to as-
sert the existence of the facts which it will explain.
Under pre-Code law, a few courts did use an "explanation" theory
to permit the introduction of hearsay statements upon which a physi-
cian had based his opinion where such statements were not admissible
under the prevailing hearsay rules of those jurisdictions. 56 That theory
was a "legal fiction," and what those courts were actually adopting was
a hearsay exception similar to section 2803(4) or even section 2703. 1 7
It would be ironic if that "legal fiction" were now used to restrict the
working of section 2703. Instead, it seems appropriate to proceed, as
Professor Callahan suggested in another context, to "consign to the ash
can, which is clearly the proper depository, a few adjectives and a
couple hundred years of legal funny-business."'' 5 8
In most situations, it will not matter whether otherwise inadmissi-
ble facts upon which an expert's opinion is based are called substantive
evidence. The distinction between substantive and non-substantive ev-
idence is important only in situations where there is an essential point
151. SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 43, at 427.
152. (c) Balancing test: limiting instructions. When the underlying facts or data would be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose other than to explain or support the expert's
opinion or inference, the court shall exclude the underlying facts or data if the danger
that they will be used for an improper purpose outweighs their value as support for the
expert's opinion. If the facts or data are disclosed before the jury, a limiting instruction
by the court shall be given upon request.
ALASKA RULE OF EVIDENCE 705(c) quoted in LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 17, § 399 (Supp.
1980).
153. Note, Admissibility of an Expert Opinion Based on Inadmissible Hearsay, 32 OKLA. L.
REv. 444, 445 n.6 (1979).
154. RoTHsTI , FEDER. RUr.Es, supra note 35, at 279. See also McElhaney, supra note 20,
at 482 & n.83.
155. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1720(1) & 1720(3) (J. Chadbourn ed. 1976).
156. Id.; McCoRMicK, supra note 17, § 293.
157. See cases summarized in 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1720(1) n.1 (J. Chadbourn ed.
1976).
158. C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE PossSSION 72 (1961).
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in a party's case which is not supported by any other substantive evi-
dence. Since a properly admitted expert opinion would, itself, be sub-
stantive evidence, it would not matter for purposes of motions for
directed verdict or summary judgment whether the supporting facts
were considered substantive evidence.
There is a possibility, however, that misanalysis of the facts upon
which an expert's opinion is based as nonsubstantive might confuse
jury deliberations. This can be illustrated by the argument by one
commentator that otherwise inadmissible statements admitted under
section 2703 "are not actually hearsay because they are not being of-
fered to prove the truth of the matter asserted." 159 The commentator
proceeds from that premise to suggest that the jury should be given an
instruction which is erroneous. "For example, the judge might instruct
the jury, you are not to decide whether Bystander's statements are true,
but whether Expert's opinion, based upon Bystander's statements, is
correct." 160 The "correctness" of Expert's opinion depends, however,
upon the truth of at least some of the facts upon which it is based.
Of course, under section 2705, the party who called Expert as a
witness might have been permitted to introduce Expert's opinion with-
out any reference to the facts upon which it is based, and the jury
would be permitted to accept that opinion.16 But an unexplained and
unsupported statement of opinion is not persuasive.1 62 The party who
called Expert was, therefore, permitted to introduce evidence to show
the basis of Expert's opinion. It would appear that, in the situation
assumed by the above example, 63 Expert based his opinion upon state-
ments made by Bystander that were not introduced into evidence ex-
cept through Expert's testimony that he relied upon the Bystander's
statements. This sounds unreasonable but one must assume the exist-
ence of facts that show that Expert is reasonably using procedures re-
lied upon by similar experts in the field, for we are told, in effect, that
the court has permitted Expert to justify his opinion by repeating By-
stander's statements.
In such a situation, the jury must be permitted to decide whether
they believe that Bystander's statements are true. If they are forbidden
159. Note, Admissibility of an Expert Opinion Based on Inadmissible Hearsay, 32 OKLA. L.
Rv. 444, 445 n.6 (1979).
160. Id. at 451 n.50.
161. See text following note 78 supra.
162. See authorities cited in note 35 supra.
163. Note, Admissibilify of an Expert Opinion Based on Inadmisible Hearsay, 32 OKLA. L.
REv. 444, 451 n.50 (1979).
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to do so, Expert has not really been permitted to base his opinion on
Bystander's statements.
There is one other way in which a question can arise regarding
whether otherwise inadmissible evidence admitted under section 2703
can be used as substantive evidence. It is possible to read Alaska Rule
of Evidence 705(c) as requiring a limiting instruction only when this
situation arises,' but it is not likely to arise very often. A party may
want to use otherwise inadmissible evidence, which was admitted
under section 2703, to explain an expert opinion based upon it to prove
something in addition to the correctness of an expert's opinion. Roth-
stein gives as an example' 65 a hearsay statement about the speed of an
automobile involved in an accident which might be used to prove some
totally different point in a case. In this situation, it is finally possible to
draw a distinction between the purpose for which the evidence must be
used, and another purpose for which it might be used.
I suggest that this additional substantive use is proper under sec-
tion 2703. There are two reasons why this substantive use should be
permitted. First, a contrary rule would require a jury instruction that
this information was adequate to prove a fact in one part of a case, but
not to prove the same fact in another part of the case. Second, the exact
opposite is true. If a statement satisfies the reasonably relied upon test
of section 2703, it ought to be trustworthy enough to be weighed as
evidence of whatever it tends to prove. Of course, a standard as general
as section 2703 is in danger of abuse, but any abuses should be resisted
directly by the use of both sections 2703 and 2403. Statements that
satisfy the requirements of both of those sections should be admitted
for all purposes.
164. See note 152 supra for text of ALAsKA R. EvID. 705(c).
165. Roms N, FEDER-AL RuLEs, supra note 35, at 279-80.
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